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ABSTRACT 
This paper used Generalized-Linear Model (GLM) with the exposure time to examine the determinants of 
credit loss provisions in Indonesia's banking sector. The research was motivated by the hypothesis that 
both macro economic variables and bank - specific have an effect on the quality of loans and loan loss 
provisions to cover risks. The results showed that loan losses could be explained primarily by a particular 
bank and macro economic variables. On asset size, the study found a positive relationship between the size 
of assets and loan loss provisions indicating that there is no benefit for the large banks of their managerial 
and technological advantages. Well-capitalized bank with a negative impact on loan loss provisions, the 
bank also showed that the capitalized ones take less credit risk. It appears clear that inefficient banks to 
risk further demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis of poor management. Using the profitability/Return 
On Average Assets (ROAA), it was found that there is a negative relationship implying that profitable bank 
save lower credit risk and also support the hypothesis that good management to take the risk is lower. On 
the impact of the price index, it was found negative showing higher inflation reduces loan loss provisions. 
In terms of economic growth/Growth Development (GD), the results provide further evidence that eco-
nomic growth reduces credit risk and that this provides further support of procyclicality in credit markets.  
 
Key words: Loan Loss Provision, Credit Risk, Poor Management Hypothesis, Procyclicality. 
 
MAKROEKONOMI DAN BANK TERTENTU TERHADAP DETERMINAN 
PROVISI KERUGIAN PINJAMAN DI INDONESIA 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini menggunakan Generalized-Linear Model (GLM) dengan waktu paparan untuk menguji 
faktor penentu provisi kerugian kredit di sektor perbankan Indonesia. Penelitian ini dimotivasi oleh hi-
potesis bahwa kedua variabel ekonomi makro dan bank - tertentu berpengaruh pada kualitas pinjaman 
dan provisi kerugian pinjaman untuk menutup risiko. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kerugian 
kredit bisa dijelaskan terutama oleh bank - tertentu dan variabel ekonomi makro. Pada ukuran aset, studi 
ini menemukan hubungan yang positif antara ukuran aset dan provisi kerugian pinjaman, menunjukkan 
bahwa tidak terdapat keuntungan bagi bank-bank besar dari aspek manajerial dan teknologi. Bank ber-
modal besar dengan dampak negatif pada provisi kerugian kredit juga menunjukkan bahwa bank yang 
dikapitalisasi mengambil risiko kredit yang lebih kecil. Tampak jelas bahwa bank yang tidak efisien ter-
hadap risiko lebih menunjukkan validitas dari hipotesis manajemen yang buruk. Menggunakan profita-
bilitas/Return On Average Assets (ROAA), ditemukan bahwa terdapat hubungan negatif yang menunjuk-
kan bahwa bank dengan laba memilih risiko kredit yang lebih rendah hal ini mendukung hipotesis bahwa 
manajemen yang baik akan mengambil risiko yang lebih rendah. Pada dampak indeks harga ditemukan 
negatif, menunjukkan bahwa inflasi yang lebih tinggi mengurangi provisi kerugian kredit. Untuk pertum-
buhan ekonomi/Growth Development (GD), hasilnya memberikan bukti bahwa pertumbuhan ekonomi 
mengurangi risiko kredit dan memberikan dukungan lebih lanjut procyclicality di pasar kredit. 
 
Kata Kunci: Provisi Kerugian Pinjaman, Risiko Kredit, Hipotesis Manajemen Buruk, Procyclicality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been noted that credit risk is the risk of 
the most significant of all the risks that bank 
must manage as it can lead to potential 
losses and failure. In addition, credit risk is 
the risk that occurs due to failure of the 
debtor, which leads to default on the obliga-
tion to pay the debt. For example, Bessis 
(2004) states that credit risk management 
includes two things, namely the risk of the 
credit decision process before a decision is 
made to follow up on loan commitments, 
plus the risk monitoring and reporting proc-
ess.  
According to the Bank Indonesia Regu-
lation (PBI) No.11/25/PBI/2009 as revision 
of PBI No. 5/8/PBI/2003 on risk manage-
ment for commercial banks, it is stated that 
that the Bank's risk management process 
shall include at least a measurement and risk 
assessment approach, structure and parame-
ter limits, and guidelines for risk manage-
ment, management information and report-
ing systems, as well as evaluation and man-
agement review. Banks need better man-
agement of credit risk in the entire portfolio, 
namely by identifying, measuring, monitor-
ing, controlling credit risk, and ensuring suf-
ficient capital is available, and also that they 
can obtain appropriate compensation for the 
risk incurred. 
One important aspect of risk manage-
ment is the ability to provide reserves 
against potential losses. Bank must create 
reserves to cover any potential loss in lend-
ing and the reserve must be in accordance 
with the bank risk taken. The identification 
of credit risk is the first step in managing 
risk and then subsequently measuring the 
risk. The results of these measurements will 
be used to determine the magnitude of the 
loan loss reserve to cover the risk. Credit 
risk can be sourced from a variety of func-
tional activities such as bank lending activi-
ties, treasury activities and investment ac-
tivities, trade financing, which can be re-
corded both on the banking book and the 
trading book. 
This paper focuses on the credit risk 
which arises from lending activities. As 
credit risk can have many different sources, 
the ability of the bank to set optimum loan 
loss provisions requires both previous and 
future assessments of the credit risk. In this 
study, we investigate the determinant of loan 
loss provisions. We use macro economic and 
bank specific variables as determinants. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
The Loan Loss Reserve in Indonesian 
Banking Regulation 
The adequacy of loan loss reserves and the 
procedures used do evaluate reserve ade-
quacy are frequently discussed in the bank-
ing regulation system. Many approaches to 
determining loan loss reserve adequacy have 
been used.  
According to Office of Currency Comp-
troller (OCC) publication in 1998, appropri-
ate evaluation of the valuation reserve must 
reflect three facts. First, reserve adequacy 
cannot be defined for any static point in 
time; it must be viewed in a dynamic sense. 
Second, adequacy of the resource must be 
viewed in a conjunction with the prospective 
quality of the credit portfolios. Third, re-
serve adequacy is in extricably related to the 
continuing stream of earnings available to 
replenish reserves and the capital available 
in case neither earnings nor reserves prove 
adequate. In Indonesia, two approaches are 
applied which are known as general reserves 
and special reserves.  
According to Bank Indonesia Regulation 
(PBI) No.8/19/PBI/2006 on productive as-
sets and establishment of loss provisions of 
which is a further amendment of the Board 
of Directors of Bank Indonesia Decree 
No.31/147/KEP/DIR dated 12 November 
1998, the establishment or provision of 
funds is called the Allowance or Allowance 
for Earning Assets (PPAP). In PPAP, the 
establishment of a reserve or allowance is 
assessed based on the collectability of the 
loan borrowers with the following condi-
tions: 
1. General reserves (G-PPAP): Credit Cate-
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gory Current= 1% 
2. Special reserves (S-PPAP): 
a. 5%  × Credit Category as Special 
b. 15% × (Credit Sub Category – Value 
of  Collateral) 
c. 50% × (Category Doubtful Loans –
Collateral Value) 
d. 100% × (Category Bad Credit – Col-
lateral Value) 
Loan loss provisions indicate the level 
of credit risk. Higher or lower loan loss pro-
visions depend on the ability of the borrower 
to repay all amounts due according to the 
contractual terms of the loan agreement. The 
ability can de judged based on the debtor’s 
payment record, overall financial condition 
and resources, debt service capacity, finan-
cial performance, net worth and future pros-
pects. Because a guarantor can be involved 
in the loan loss mitigation, the prospects for 
support from any financially responsible 
guarantors is also important. When mitiga-
tion involves collateral, the nature and de-
gree of protection provided by the value of 
any underlying collateral is also important. 
Perez et al. (2006) note that general pro-
visions usually rise during an economic up-
turn, as banks give out more loans and the 
demand for credit is high. During a down-
turn, loans to riskier companies would incur 
larger loan losses as risks materialize, and 
therefore higher specific loan-loss provisions 
follow. 
After the revised FAS55 in 2006, the 
term of the PPAP was changed to Impair-
ment Loss Reserves, which is often referred 
to as CKPN. In CKPN, the establishment or 
a provision of funds assessed from the 
debtor's credit evaluations conducted by the 
bank. If a banker thinks that a bank’s provi-
sions of credit to a debtors experiencing im-
pairment (decreased), then the bank should 
establish a fund or reserve for credit. Be-
cause the debtor's credit evaluation is based 
on the decision of each bank, then each bank 
has its own policy in shaping there serve 
funds to the debtor’s credit. 
However, the bank's policy should not 
deviate from some of the criteria contained 
in the PAPI (Guidelines for Indonesian 
Banking Accounting) after a revision of FAS 
55. The measurement provisions of reserves 
by CKPN based PAPI (Indonesia Banking 
Accounting Manual) Revised 2008 is di-
vided into: 
a. Individual Provision, where each bank can 
choose the calculation to measure the CKPN 
value of individuals using the methodology. 
The first, Discounted Cash Flow Method 
estimates the future cash flows (interest + 
principal payments) discounted at interest 
rates. The second, Fair Value of Collateral 
method calculates provisionsby using the 
value of cash flows for the guarantee or col-
lateral in the future. The third, Observable 
Market PriceMethod has the value of provi-
sion determined from the market price of the 
credit.  
b. Collective provision or portfolio provi-
sion. Bank managers can choose two tech-
niques where the first is based on the calcu-
lation of cash flow contractual creditors in 
the futureand second, the provision is based 
on the historical loss rates loan debtors after 
deducting the loan repayment rate.  
In short, we can conclude that the estab-
lishment of the provision according to PPAP 
and CKPN is basically similar in purpose 
but it is clear that the calculation for loan 
provision using the old methodology is sim-
pler than the CKPN calculations, because we 
only take into account the allowance for 
funds based on the collectibility of the loans 
of borrowers. As for the calculation of 
CKPN, we need to check one by one if the 
loan borrower is experiencing impairment or 
not. After that we will form a reserve fund 
after there is evidence that the debtor is ex-
periencing impairment. 
In the literature, lenders also indirectly 
contribute to problem loans due to the fail-
ure to know the borrowers and understand 
their business. Lack of applicant verification 
is an example. Bank’s staff may only per-
form a “remote control analysis” without 
visiting the borrower in recommending a 
credit and fail to verify information from the 
borrower. In a country where credit history 
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information is lacking, the failure to know 
the background of the borrower, including 
his present credit standing and legal status 
contribute to the excessive level of problem 
loans. Risk from bank operations are also 
especially related to the failure of internal 
system such as failure to know the degree of 
reliability of the collateral taken and failure 
to obtain a valid security. Documentation 
problem scan also exaggerate the problem. 
All of the points mentioned above are 
known as problems of selection under 
asymmetric information theory. 
The other source of problems is moral 
hazard. It is a problem arising after banks 
disburse money to borrowers. Banks may 
fail to supervise the utilization of loan pro-
ceeds. Borrowers may not fully use the 
money in accordance with the purpose stated 
in the loan agreement. Due to disbursement 
targets, loan officers may neglect the sign of 
non – compliance of the pre-agreed condi-
tions. However, the lender nevertheless con-
tinues to release the facility and it can end 
up becoming a problem loan.  
In reality, banks also tend to reduce 
costs by ignoring follow up procedures. It 
can be in the form of no internal review, in-
adequate internal review systems and in 
most cases lack of staff to handle the moni-
toring process. As loan problems emerge, in 
most case it is not a rapid process but a 
gradual one. Lack of monitoring can cause 
banks to fail to recognize early symptoms 
and adverse signals which in practice are 
known as “red flags” symptoms of late re-
payments. 
Credit risk is one of the most important 
areas of risk management. It plays an impor-
tant role mainly for banking institutions, 
which try to develop their own credit risk 
models in order to increase bank portfolio 
quality. There are three approaches com-
monly applied. The first is traditional mod-
els where bank collect client specific infor-
mation and then judge if the client is a good 
quality borrower.  
The second is option pricing known as 
the structural model. It is based on financial 
option pricing theory developed by Black 
and Scholes (1973). Here, the value of a firm 
is modeled as an option price. An important 
contribution to credit risk modeling was 
given by Merton (1974). In this seminal pa-
per, Merton introduced the idea of applying 
option pricing theory to the valuation of 
risky bonds and loans. In this model, a bor-
rower will have an incentive to default 
whenever the market value of the firm be-
comes lower than the amount borrowed.  
The third approach is called a reduced 
form models. These models use the market 
bond price as an input to derive the default 
probability and recovery rate. In summary, 
all approaches area tool to reduce problem 
loans or what is technically known as prob-
ability of default (PD), Loss given default 
(LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD).  
Together with estimation of loan size (S) 
and effective maturity (M), these credit risk 
components can be used for determining the 
capital requirement when banks apply Inter-
nal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB) (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). 
According to Gunadi (2011), the major risk 
of commercial banks is credit risk. Banks 
have to maintain a level of capital, which is 
92% of the total capital required to absorb 
credit risks. The credit to core capital and 
deposit ratio is 80%. The NPL’s as a per-
centage of total loans must be below 5%.  
According to Hlawatsch and Ostrowski 
(2010), when referring to the specific provi-
sions with the occurrence of a credit event 
according to IFRS, an unnecessary capital 
increase will result. This holds because the 
expected loss according to Basel II then 
equals the product of LGD and EAD, which 
is usually higher than the specific provision 
under IFRS. If the specific provision is less 
than 20%, the risk weighted asset (RWA) is 
150%. It increases regulatory capital. At the 
same time, provisions will be at least at the 
same amount with the expected loss. An in-
sufficient amount is taken from capital for 
provisioning and so the liable capital has to 
be increased. It means loan loss provision 
must increase too.  
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Bank Specific Factors 
Berger and De Young (1997) produced a 
seminal paper on problem loans and it is 
becoming a standard on discussing the 
sources of problem loan. They employed 
Granger-causality techniques to test four 
hypotheses regarding the relationships 
among loan quality, cost efficiency, and 
bank capital. The analysis suggests that the 
intertemporal relationships between loan 
quality and cost efficiency run in both direc-
tions. For the bad luck hypothesis - increases 
in nonperforming loans tend to be followed 
by decreases in measured cost efficiency, 
suggesting that high levels of problem loans 
cause banks to increase spending on moni-
toring, working out, and/or selling off these 
loans, and possibly become more diligent in 
administering the portion of their existing 
loan portfolio that is currently performing.  
For a bad management hypothesis that 
applies for the industry as a whole, the data 
favor the bad management hypothesis that 
decreases in measured cost efficiency are 
generally followed by increases in non-
performing loans; evidence that bad man-
agement practices are manifested not only in 
excess expenditures, but also in subpart un-
derwriting and monitoring practices that 
eventually lead to non-performing loans.  
For the skimping hypothesis, it is clear 
that increases in measured cost efficiency 
generally precede increases in nonperform-
ing loans, suggesting that these banks pur-
posely trade short-run expense reductions 
for long-run reductions in loan quality. For 
the moral hazard or capital ratio hypothesis, 
decreases in bank capital ratios generally 
precede increases in non-performing loans 
for banks with low capital ratios, evidence 
that thinly capitalized banks may respond to 
moral hazard incentives by taking increased 
portfolio risks.  
Although these four hypotheses are not 
applied to all banks and have a relatively 
small effect on banks on average, they may 
have a substantial effect on individual banks 
that are most subject to bad luck, bad man-
agement, skimping, and/or moral hazard. 
The implication is if the bad luck hypothesis 
is in place, bank failures are caused primar-
ily by uncontrollable external events, and 
implies that prudential regulation and super-
vision could reduce the risk of failure by 
limiting banks’ exposures to external shocks.  
When bad management is present, the 
major risks facing financial institutions are 
caused internally so that bank supervision 
should consider cost efficiency in the super-
vising process. When a regulator recognizes 
the skimping practice, supervisors pay spe-
cial attention to banks’ internal credit control 
procedures. The moral hazard hypothesis 
implies that bank supervisors should monitor 
capital ratios carefully and require actions to 
raise the ratios quickly when they become 
low.  
The capital allocation feature of loan-
loss provisions in the Basel II framework 
may provide incentives for banks to increase 
provisions to meet the capital requirement. 
Under the regulation, a bank is required to 
provide provisions at least the same with the 
expected loss. Bank that put less capital than 
the expected loses are penalized by reducing 
their core capital up to 50%. In particular, 
banks with low capital levels may increase 
loan-loss provision levels in order to comply 
with the regulatory requirement and to miti-
gate solvency risk. Therefore, banks’ capital 
adequacy ratios could have an important 
effect on banks’ decisions in setting the op-
timal level of loan loss provisions. 
 
Macroeconomic Factors 
Macroeconomic factors may inhibit herding 
behavior of bankers in relation to future 
credit risk. Rajan (1994) explained that the 
herd behavior of the bank managers during 
expansion periods may be one of the reasons 
why nonperforming assets (NPA) accumu-
lates immediately after the boom periods 
because of the competition and peer pres-
sure. During the expansive business cycle, 
loan quality tends to be better and competi-
tion on loan marketing is so high that banks 
reduce the quality requirement. When the 
business cycle reverses from boom to bust, 
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the loan quality deteriorates faster. 
Koopman and Lucas (2004) used a mul-
tivariate unobserved components frame-
work to separate the credit and business 
cycles. Credit risk in this study is defined as 
business failure so when the business fail-
ure is high, a bank will experience higher 
credit risk. They used this model for de-
scribing the dynamic behavior of credit risk 
factors in relation to the real economy. 
They used data on real GDP, credit spreads 
and business failure for the US economy. 
They empirically showed a positive rela-
tionship between spreads and business fail-
ure rates and negative GDP meaning a 
higher interest rate spread increased busi-
ness failure and higher economic growth 
reduced business failure. 
Interesting results on the loan quality 
and business cycle is provided by Hu, Li and 
Chiu (2004) that an inverse relationship ex-
ists between bank size and NPL’s. Their ar-
gument is that large banks have better risk 
management strategies that usually translate 
into more superior loan portfolios than their 
smaller counterparts. Hu, Li and Chiu (2004) 
also found that the banks with higher gov-
ernment ownership recorded lower non-
performing loans. 
Problem loans consist of both non-
performing loans and non delinquent loans, 
which the banks consider to be particularly 
doubtful. The example is one of good loan 
quality but the borrowers experience busi-
ness disruption due to fire or natural disaster 
or even deteriorating economic conditions. 
Banks have to estimate their expected losses 
on problem loans. There will thus be a close 
connection between banks’ problem loans 
and the future judgment of economic condi-
tion.  
Perez, Salas-Fumasand Saurina (2006) 
note that general provisions usually rise dur-
ing an economic upturn, as banks give out 
more loans and the demand for credit is high 
during this period. During a downturn, loans 
to riskier companies would incur larger loan 
losses as risks materialize, and therefore 
higher specific loan-loss provisions follow. 
The impacts of macroeconomic factors 
as well as microeconomic variables on prob-
lem loans were investigated by Das and 
Ghosh (2007). They examined the factors 
affecting problem loans of Indian state-
owned banks for the period 1994-2005. 
They took into account both macro and mi-
cro variables and found that at the macro 
level, GDP growth played a very important 
role and any decrease in economic growth 
brought a negative impact as it increased 
credit risk. At a micro level, they found that 
real loan growth, operating expenses and 
bank size play an important role in influenc-
ing problem loans. Higher loan growth in-
creased credit risk. Inefficient banks tend to 
take high credit risk. 
The GDP growth is the most general and 
most direct measure of macroeconomic de-
velopments. It is regarded as the first and 
foremost indicator of the demand for bank-
ing services, including the extension of 
loans, and the supply of funds, such as de-
posits. As such it is a direct determinant of 
profits. That means, GDP growth is the most 
useful indicator of the business cycle. 
Empirical studies tend to confirm the 
aforementioned link between the phase of 
the cycle and credit defaults. Quagliariello 
(2008) found that the business cycle affects 
the NPL ratio for a large panel of Italian 
banks over the period 1985 to 2002. The 
study covers accounting ratios of 207 
banks. When the economic situation wors-
ened, the bank loan quality decreased con-
firming the importance of the business cy-
cle on loan quality. Cifter, Yilmazer and 
Cifter (2009), applying a neural network 
based model, found a lagged impact of in-
dustrial production on the number of non-
performing loans in the Turkish financial 
system over the period January 2001 to No-
vember 2007. Previously, Salas and Saurina 
(2002) estimated a significant negative con-
temporaneous effect of GDP growth on the 
NPL ratio and inferred a quick transmission 
of macroeconomic developments to the 
ability of economic agents to service their 
loans. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
Generalized linear models (GLMs) are 
mainly used for relating responses to linear 
combinations of predictor variables. It is able 
to handle discreet or continuous dependent 
variables to establish models for rates, pro-
portions, binary variables, ordinal variables as 
well as multinomial variables. The GLM ap-
proach is attractive because it is able to pro-
vide a general theoretical framework for 
many commonly encountered statistical mod-
els and to simplify the implementation of 
these different models in statistical software, 
since essentially the same algorithm can be 
used for estimation, inference and assessing 
model adequacy for all GLMs. See Rabe-
Hesketh and Everitt (2006).  
The paper’s contribution to the topic of 
loan-loss provisions is of an empirical na-
ture. To our knowledge, there is no prior 
work done on the determinants of loan-loss 
provisions in the Philippines. This study 
mainly follows approach used by Louzis, 
Vouldis and Metaxas (2010) and Bonfim 
(2009) that study the impact of micro and 
macroeconomic influences on credit risk. 
The study combines both micro internal and 
macro economic aspects that influence the 
credit risk. The difference with both studies 
is the measure of credit risk. Previous stud-
ies use non performing loans, whereas we 
apply loan loss provisions as a measure of 
credit risk. We are aware that credit risk is 
multifaceted and requires many aspects of 
consideration. Both macroeconomic and 
bank-specific factors appear to have a role to 
play, with real GDP growth and price index 
being the most important determinants ac-
cording to procyclicality or business cycle 
theory. As the study aims to find a link be-
tween bank-specific factors and the macro-
economic environment on loan loss provi-
sion, the implication is useful for policy as-
sessment purposes. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) analyze 
the cyclical patterns of bank loan loss provi-
sions. They find that loan loss provisions 
have a pro-cyclical effect, as they are nega-
tively related to GDP growth. Furthermore, 
bankers mitigate this pro-cyclical behavior 
of loan loss provisions by applying income 
smoothing practices. Bankers put less provi-
sion in the expansion period and higher pro-
visions during difficult economic condition.  
We include GDP growth to investigate 
the procyclical effect of provisioning. The 
common view is that an economic upswing 
and rising incomes indicate improving con-
ditions for firms and reduce the likelihood of 
loan defaults, whereas a recession will have 
an impact on higher loan defaults. Bankers 
are expected to reflect this situation in their 
decision making process by lowering provi-
sions during an economic expansion and 
increasing them during slowing economic 
conditions. 
Attention should be given as most of the 
data used in the study are accounting data 
and It is possible that accounting ratios may 
also experience a managerial intervention. 
The risk that data experiencing some treat-
ment such as earnings smoothing is un-
avoidable. The framework of the study is 
presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 













Bank Specific Variables: 
Capital (ETA) 
Profitability (ROAA) 
Cost Efficiency (CIR) 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Different data sources were collected for 
empirical analysis. It then conducts a panel 
data approach. The bank-level data on finan-
cial statement report is solely collected from 
the database of Bank Scope, produced by 
Bureau Van Dijk Corporation. Macroeco-
nomic variables are obtained from Indonesia 
Statistic Office. The variables and their defi-
nition are present in Table 1. 
To examine the determinants of loan 
loss provision to total loan (LLR) in Indone-
sia, It uses a simple general linear model 
(GLM).The general linear model (GLM) is a 
flexible statistical model that incorporates 
normally distributed dependent variables and 
categorical or continuous independent vari-
ables. The model can be formulated as the 
following. 
ROA = α + β1 LASSET+ β2 ETA + β3 CAR 
+ β4 APDR + β5 CAR + β6 EGRW + β7 
CPI + ε  (1) 
To assess the ability of the model to ex-
plain the loan loss provision (LLR), we use a 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) technique, be-
cause traditional regression testing tech-
niques such as t-tests and F-test are not ap-
plicable. In this study, goodness of fit is 
tested using Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
and Log likelihood ratio. These tests are 
used to test the capability of the model to 
explain the variability of the LLR. To asses 
the capacity of the individual variable, we 
use the t-test. In this study, we assume that 
the variance function (V(u)) follows the 
Poisson Distribution and the link function 
(g(u) = u) is assumed to be an identity func-
tion.  
According to the literature, credit risk is 
lower for large banks as a large bank has an 
advantage in the credit management system 
and the bank can buy better risk manage-
ment tools to manage credit risk. On the eq-
uity side, a weak capital position can in-
crease credit risk (LLRGL) as a weak capital 
bank tends to take more risk at the cost of 
depositors and the deposit insurance com-
pany. On the efficiency side, lower CIR in-
creases credit risk (LLRGL) as the bank 
tends to reduce costs for loan monitoring.  
On the profitability side, a lower ROAA 
increases LLRGL as ROAA indicates the 
bad management situation. A bad perform-
ing bank is a reflection of bad management 
quality. Banks that put more assets into pro-
ductive forms may reflect moral hazard be-
havior as the management may be ignoring 
the liquidity risk as management is too fo-
cused on profit and not risk. Excess regula-
tory capital (CAR) may reduce credit risk 
(LLRGL) as banks comply with regulation. 
Various macroeconomic indicators can 
be used as explanatory variables relating to 
the indicator of the credit risk in the banking 
system. Interest rates and gross domestic 
product (GDP) are most commonly consid-
ered in this context in the literature. Gross 
Table 1  
Variables, Definition and Data Sources 
 
No. Variable Definition Hypothesis Sources 
1 LLRGL Loan loss reserve to loan Tested Variable Bank 
2 LASSET Logarithm of total asset (-) Size Bank 
2 ETA Equity to total asset (-) Bad Management Bank 
3 CIR Cost to income ratio (-) Skimping  Bank 
4 ROAA Return on Average Asset (-) Bad Management Bank 
5 APDR Productive asset to total deposit (-) Moral Hazard Bank 
6 CAR Equity Capital to Risky asset (-) Moral Hazard Bank 
7 CPI Consumer Price index (100=2007) (-) Pro-cyclicality Business Cycle Statistics Office 
8 EGRW Economic Growth (-) Pro-cyclicality Business Cycle Statistics Office 
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domestic product (GDP) is a basic indicator 
of the cyclical position of the economy. 
Consumer price index (CPI) indicates the 
condition of the economy where higher CPI 
figures provide information that there are 
imbalances in the economy. Higher CPI in-
creases credit risk (LLRGL). A decline or 
low growth in GDP affects credit risk. A rise 
in interest rates affects the loan portfolio in a 
similar way, increasing the credit risk. How-
ever, in this study we exclude interest rates 
as it is correlated with CPI. 
 
Result 
Table 2 presents the description of the data 
employed in this study. The average value 
for LLRGL is 3.49% with minimum 0.32%, 
maximum 29.72% and standard deviation is 
3.26%. The coefficient of variation (CV)is 
measured as the standard deviation divided 
by the mean value, and takes a value of 
91%. Asset size (LASSET) has a mean value 
of 14.73 with a minimum of 10.81, a maxi-
mum of 17.92 and the CV is 9%. The aver-
age value for equity to total asset (ETA) is 
11.79, with a maximum of 50.92 and a 
minimum of 0.42. The CV is 61% meaning 
the variation is 61% of its mean value. 
On the efficiency ratio (CIR), the mean 
value is 60.25, the minimum is 16.77 and the 
maximum is 873.58. The CV for CIR is 
94%. The mean value of profitability 
(ROAA) is 1.69, with a minimum of -1.33 
and a maximum of 5.75, with the CV 0.61. 
The ratio of productive asset to deposit 
(APDR) has a mean value of 8.84, a mini-
mum of 0.76 and a maximum of 1814 and a 
standard deviation of 117.80. The CV is 
1300%. For the regulatory capital (CAR), 
the mean is 22.08, the minimum is 0.08 and 
maximum is 129%. The CV for CAR is 
73%. 
For the macroeconomic variables, the 
mean of the price index (CPI) is 102 with a 
minimum value of 75.22 and a maximum 
around 124. Please note that it is an indexed 
ratio where 2007 is set as the basis. The eco-
nomic growth (EGRW) has a mean value of 
5.7 with a minimum of 4.58 and a maximum 
of 6.54. The CV for EGRW is 0.11. From 
the normality test, we find that all data is not 
normally distributed. 
Table 3 presents the GLM regression re-
sults. Before we discuss the results, an ex-
planation on the fitness of the model is pro-
vided here. As the estimation uses maximum 
likelihood, the first statistics that should be 
considered is log likelihood. The log likeli-
hood is -535.54 with Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) 4.6 and Bayesian Informa-
tion criterion -865.79. It is clear that the 
model can be used for further analysis. 
The result shows that size of asset is 
positive and significant at 1%. It means lar-
ger banks put aside more loan provision than 
smaller banks indicating the large banks  
Table 2  
The Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
 
No Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Coeficient Variation (CV)
1 LLRGL 237 3.49 3.16 0.32 29.72 0.91
2 LASSET 237 14.73 1.39 10.81 17.92 0.09
3 ETA 237 11.79 7.14 0.47 50.92 0.61
4 CIR 237 60.25 56.45 16.77 873.58 0.94
5 ROAA 237 1.69 1.02 -1.33 5.74 0.61
6 APDR 237 8.84 117.80 0.76 1814.65 13.32
7 CAR 237 22.08 16.07 8.08 129.94 0.73
8 CPI 237 101.88 16.09 75.22 124.42 0.16
9 EGRW 237 5.70 0.61 4.58 6.54 0.11
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experience more problem than smaller bank. 
We expect that the sign will be negative to 
indicate the benefit in managerial skill and 
system support. It is understandable as large 
banks are state banks that must perform 
some government credit program such as 
people business credit (KUR).  
It is also reality that after the banking 
crisis in 1998, the large state banks kept 
their problem assets in their balance sheet 
and it made the banks set aside more reserve 
to compensate with these quality problems. 
In short, the study is in contrast to Hu et al. 
(2004) that found an inverse relationship 
between bank size and credit risk (NPL). 
Such differences may come from the differ-
ence in the measurement definition of credit 
risk and country setting. We may interpret 
that large banks may prefer to put aside lar-
ger reserves than smaller bank as manage-
ment are aware that their risk is larger and 
more sensitive to external sources of risk. 
On the capital ratio (ETA), the study 
finds that strong capital has a negative impact 
on credit risk or loan loss reserves. It means 
the banks that have higher capital have lower 
credit risk as they put create smaller loan loss 
provisions. There is a tendency that well capi-
talized bank that is generally controlled by 
good management team, experience lower 
credit risk. In other situations, lower capital 
banks take more credit risk as part of man-
agement gambling with the bank. It is sup-
porting the evidence that there is the possibil-
ity of a bad management hypothesis applica-
ble in the industry. The evidence also rejects 
the possibility that strong banks generously 
put aside more capital. 
On the cost efficiency (CIR), we find 
that inefficient banks take more credit risk 
and are forced to provide more loan loss re-
serves. The CIR is positive and significant at 
8%. This finding supports the skimping hy-
pothesis that inefficient banks undertake ex-
cessive risk taking which indicates that the 
bad management hypothesis is stronger than 
the skimping hypothesis. Low cost effi-
ciency is positively associated with increases 
in future nonperforming loans. We expect 
that banks which devote less effort to ensure 
higher loan quality will seem to be more 
cost-efficient but will have higher problem 
loans due to a lack of supervision and moni-
toring. It seems the bad management bank, 
characterized as high cost to income ratio, is 
stronger.  
On the profitability measure (ROAA), 
the coefficient is positive and significant at 
1% meaning that profitable banks put more 
into loan loss reserve. We may interpret the 
result in two different ways. On profit ori-
ented banks, they are willing to take more 
risk to earn more profit (moral hazard). In 
other way around, profitable banks put more 
loan loss reserves to shield against the tax 
(bad management). It seems that both moral 
hazard and bad management may be inter-
twined. 
Table 3  
The GLM Result 
 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistics Significant 
LASSET 0.290 0.094 3.080 0% 
ETA -0.064 0.025 -2.580 1% 
CIR 0.008 0.005 1.740 8% 
ROAA 0.652 0.132 4.940 0% 
CAR 0.016 0.013 1.250 21% 
APDR 0.002 0.001 1.740 8% 
EGRW -0.562 0.207 -2.720 1% 
CPI -0.024 0.009 -2.700 1% 
_cons -3.940 1.926 -2.050 4% 
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For profit purposes, bank managers are 
required to invest resources into productive 
assets. To see how deposits are invested into 
productive assets (APDR), we use the pro-
ductive asset to deposit ratio. The result 
shows that the coefficient for APDR is 0.002 
and is significant at 8%. It means that as the 
management undertakes aggressive bank 
management, the credit risk is increased in 
term of loan loss provision. The result sup-
ports the bad management hypothesis that an 
aggressive management attitude increases 
risk.  
On the impact of regulatory capital 
(CAR), the study reveals that CAR is not 
important for credit risk as the measure of 
credit in this study is based on ex post risk 
(LLRGL) whereas CAR is more focused on 
ex-ante risk (risk weighted asset). The coef-
ficient is 0.02 and not significant as the t-
statistics is 1.25. It is clear that loan loss re-
serve are not related to the strength of bank 
capita..  
It is expected that the CPI will have a 
negative sign to indicate that higher CPI 
means unstable economic conditions. The 
fact that the CPI has coefficient -0.02 and 
significant at 1% confident level, shows that 
during the period of study, the CPI is not a 
good indicator of the business cycle. We are 
aware that the CPI may also reflect the de-
mand power or purchasing power that has an 
opposite impact with the business cycle on 
credit risk. However, we can also interpret 
that inflation rate during the period of the 
study as a period of low inflation. In the pre-
vious decade, Indonesia experienced double 
digit inflation from time to time. 
On the economic growth, we can see 
that the coefficient is -0.56 and significant at 
1%. It means higher economic growth, indi-
cates a positive business cycle, and reduces 
the credit risk. It is clear that EGRW is a 
good predictor for credit risk providing fur-
ther evidence on the impact of macroeco-
nomic variables on loan quality. 
Our study provides some insights into 
how the behavior of credit risk as measured 
by loan loss provision varied during 2004 to 
2011 as shown in Table 4. On the asset size, 
it clear that the coefficient is positive indicat-
ing the positive relationship between asset 
size and loan loss provision. Our previous 
assumption that larger size bank may be 
beneficial for better risk management and 
expertise in loan decision, is not valid. Large 
Table 4 
Summary of the Results, Hypothesis and Conclusion 
 
No. Variable Coeff Hypothesis LoS Conclusion 
1 LASSET 0.29 (-) Size 0% Larger bank has higher risk 
2 ETA -0.06 (+) Moral hazard / Bad 
management 
1% Strong capital reduce risk 
2 CIR 0.01 (-) Skimping or 
(+) Bad management 
8% Inefficient bank has higher 
risk (bad management) 
3 ROAA 0.65 (-) Bad Management 0% Profitable bank has lower 
risk (Good management) 
4 APDR 0.00 (-) Moral Hazard 8% Aggressive management has 
higher risk (bad 
management) 
5 CAR 0.02 (-) Moral Hazard 21%  
6 CPI -0.02 (-) Pro-cyclicality 
Business Cycle 
1% CPI is more purchasing 
power not business cycle 
7 EGRW -0.56 (-) Pro-cyclicality 
Business Cycle 
1% EGRW is business cycle 
indicator 
LoS=Level of Significant. 
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banks experiences higher loan loss indicating 
that large banks are not immune from making 
wrong decision in their credit process. 
As most of large banks in this study are 
government banks, that naturally play a role 
as an agent of development, we can con-
clude that the result is reasonable. It is also 
supported by the fact that during the eco-
nomic crisis in 1998, only small banks can 
survive without government support. All 
large banks experience dramatic problem 
loan and this forced them to provide more 
loan loss provision during early 2000.  
However we can not eliminate the pos-
sibility of accounting treatment or income 
smoothing. Although this study does not 
discuss this practice thoroughly, the possibil-
ity the large banks using loan loss provision 
as a tool for income smoothing is not closed. 
Various studies such as Fonseca and Gon-
zález (2008) and Kanagaretnama, Krishnan 
and Loboc (2010) unveiled the practice of 
income smoothing in the banking industry 
using loan loss provision. 
On the capital side, the moral hazard and 
bad management hypothesis is evidence. 
There is strong evidence that stronger capital 
bank results in less loan loss provision. Un-
der moral hazard theory, higher capital bank 
takes less risk but the lower capital bank 
takes more risk. If we use loan loss provi-
sion as credit risk measure, it clear that a 
lower capital bank takes more risk. 
We can not make a strong decision as to 
which one is better, the skimping or bad 
management, in explaining the cost ineffi-
ciency. However, the bad management hy-
pothesis is more realistic as it is positive to 
cost inefficiency. Low cost efficiency is 
positively associated with increases in future 
nonperforming loans. A bad management 
bank hypothesis, assumes that when the 
bank is badly managed, the inefficiency is 
high. As our measure of efficiency is cost to 
income ratio (CIR), it is clear that inefficient 
banks own higher loan loss provision. 
On the ROA, there is strong evidence 
that the bad management hypothesis is 
strong. We expect the sign to be negative to 
indicate the bad management hypothesis. 
However, our empirical evidence shows the 
opposite situation. This situation indicates 
the evidence of tax shield where the profit-
able banks try to reduce tax payment by put-
ting more income as a provision. 
On the macroeconomic variables, the 
price is producing totally different expecta-
tion. We expect a positive relationship to 
indicate the inflation rate increased credit 
risk. The result is negative meaning higher 
CPI reduces credit risk or loan loss provi-
sion.  
Economic growth is a good indicator for 
procyclicality. When economic growth is 
high, the credit risk in terms of loan loss 
provision is lower. Perez et al. (2006) note 
that general provisions usually rise during an 
economic upturn, as banks give out more 
loans and the demand for credit is high dur-
ing this period. During a downturn, loans to 
riskier companies would incur larger loan 
losses as risks materialize, and therefore 
higher specific loan-loss provisions follow. 
Bankers on average create too little provi-
sions in good times and are then forced to 
increase them during cyclical downturns. 
The behavior can magnify losses during the 
bad time as bank incur loses and at the same 
time must provide loan loss reserve.  
When referring to the specific provisions 
with occurrence of a credit event according 
to IFRS an unnecessary capital increase will 
result. This holds because the expected loss 
according to Basel II then equals the product 
of LGD and EAD, which is usually higher 
than the specific provision under IFRS. 
Therefore, an insufficient amount is taken 
for provisioning and so the liable capital has 
to be increased. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION AND LIMITATIONS 
In this study, a GLM approach was applied 
in which it includes time as an exposure 
variable to investigate the determinant of 
loan loss provision in Indonesian banking 
during 2004 to 2011. Not all banks are in-
cluded in this study. And no selection crite-
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rion is set. The selection of bank in the sam-
ple is merely on the availability of the data. 
We examine the determinant of loan loss 
provisions in Indonesian banking using mac-
roeconomic and bank specific variables.  
It was found that macroeconomic vari-
ables play an important role in the determi-
nation of the ratio of loan loss provisions. 
Economic growth has a negative impact on 
loan loss provisions meaning higher eco-
nomic growth reduces credit risk and then 
loan loss provisions. Economic growth pro-
vides evidence that procyclicality of behav-
ior of credit risk is viable and ignoring can 
result in a devastating impact on bank finan-
cial stability. On the inflation rate, the result 
shows that a higher inflation rate (CPI) re-
duces loan loss provisions. The result is op-
posite to the prior expectation that a higher 
inflation rate increases credit risk.  
Furthermore, bank specific variables 
such as assets provide interesting results. 
Large banks tend to own higher loan loss 
provisions indicating the non existence of 
managerial as well as technological benefits 
of large banks. The result probably because 
most of the large banks in the sample are 
state banks that, beside doing business for a 
profit motive, also serve as an agent of de-
velopment especially in the implementation 
of government credit programs.  
On the capital (ETA) we find that moral 
hazard behavior is evident where lower capi-
tal banks take more risk and so put aside 
more loan loss provision than strongly capi-
talized banks. It means the banks that have a 
higher capital have lower credit risk as they 
put less loan loss provision. There is a ten-
dency that well capitalized bank that is gen-
erally controlled by a good management 
team experience lower credit risk. In other 
words, a lower capital bank takes more 
credit risk as part of management gambling 
with the bank. 
On the cost efficiency (CIR), we find 
that inefficient banks have more credit risk. 
This finding supports the bad management 
hypothesis that badly managed banks take 
excessive risks and indicating that the bad 
management hypothesis is stronger than 
skimping hypothesis. Low cost efficiency is 
positively associated with increases in future 
nonperforming loans. It seems the bad man-
agement bank, characterized as high cost to 
income ratio, is stronger. On the profitability 
measure (ROAA), the coefficient is positive 
and significant at 1% meaning that profitable 
banks take more risks and then put more into 
loan loss reserves. On the impact of regula-
tory capital (CAR), the study reveals that 
CAR is not important for credit risk as the 
measure of credit in this study is based on ex 
post risk (LLRGL) where CAR is more fo-
cused on ex-ante risk (risk weighted asset). 
The study implies that regulation on 
loan loss provisions should also consider the 
future economic conditions, especially the 
prediction of economic growth. The inclu-
sion of an economic variable will provide 
better prediction of loan loss provisions re-
quired to cover credit risk. 
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